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I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews decisions by the Supreme Court of Florida in the
substantive area of criminal law published between May 1, 2002 and Sep-
tember 1, 2004.1 The time period begins where the last criminal law review
survey created for this Law Review ended.2 This article will follow the con-
ventions in selecting cases for discussion utilized in prior criminal law sur-
vey articles.3 As in past surveys, this article will focus on significant cases
dealing with substantive issues concerning the area of criminal law decided
by the Supreme Court of Florida, but it will not address district courts of
appeal decisions that have not been appealed to the supreme court, nor will it
discuss cases that only deal with evidentiary or procedural issues raised on
appeal.4
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, J.D.,
Indiana University, 1978; B.A., Indiana University, 1975.
1. The author has selected, as the beginning and ending points of this article, decisions
reported in Volumes 804 through 877 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series.
2. See William E. Adams, Jr., Criminal Law: 2000-2002 Survey of Florida Law, 27
NOVA L. REv. 1 (2002).
3. As in past criminal law surveys, this article will not address issues concerning crimi-
nal procedure, such as search and seizure. Although significant to the practitioner, those is-
sues raise constitutional concerns that extend beyond the substantive focus of this piece.
Furthermore, consistent with past articles, this survey will not generally address the complex
and specialized areas of death penalty and sentencing guidelines. The article will address
select sentencing and procedural cases that involve disputes about the definition of substantive
crimes.
4. The article does not cover every decision issued by the Supreme Court of Florida
during this time period. As in past criminal law surveys, cases that simply apply standard fact
patterns to well-settled rules of law are not discussed. Instead, the survey attempts to identify
and discuss cases that have settled conflicts, interpreted statutes for the first time, or altered
1
Adams: Criminal Law: 2002-2004 Survey of Florida Law
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LAW REVIEW
During this two-year period, most of the cases selected have clarified
conflicts between the district courts of appeal concerning the interpretation
of a variety of criminal statutory provisions. Section II will discuss a number
of cases in which defendants challenged the finding that they had premedi-
tated the killings that they committed. In Section III, the article will look at
the required mens rea for some controlled substance statutes. Section IV
revisits an issue discussed in the last criminal law summary in this Law Re-
view: the correct application of the "remaining in" phrase in the state's bur-
glary statute. Section V deals with cases that involve disputes concerning the
interpretation of a variety of criminal law statutes. As has been the case with
previous criminal law surveys in this Law Review, the Supreme Court of
Florida has considered a number of challenges involving new statutory inter-
pretation questions and has also revisited some recurring issues.
II. HOMICIDE
As one leading commentator on criminal law has noted, almost all states
that divide murder into grades include "willful, deliberate, [and] premedi-
tated" killings as first-degree murder. 5 Florida's homicide statute continues
to maintain that a "premeditated design" is a condition that will elevate a
homicide to a first-degree capital felony.6 Although commonly used, courts
have had much difficulty in applying this term in a precise and consistent
manner. 7 Rather than designate a certain minimum amount of time that will
satisfy the standard, the Supreme Court of Florida has stated its standard for
this phrase to mean a "fully formed conscious purpose to kill," which may be
"formed a moment before the act but must exist for a sufficient length of
time to permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the
probable result of that act." 8 The court has also noted that it can 'be formed
in a moment and need only exist 'for such time as will allow the accused to
be conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and the probable
existing understandings of a statutory provision, or otherwise clarified or changed the substan-
tive criminal law in Florida.
5. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.03[C][1] (3d ed. 2001).
6. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1)(a) (2003). "The unlawful killing of a human being: 1)
When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any
human being ... is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082." Id.
7. Id.
8. Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d
1019, 1021 (Fla. 1986)).
[Vol. 29: 1:1
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result of that act."' 9 In order to satisfy this elusively imprecise standard, the
Supreme Court of Florida has attempted to provide guidance by stating that
the following factual circumstances can support an inference that the killer's
state of mind satisfies the premeditation requirement: "the nature of the
weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous
difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was com-
mitted, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted."10
In the past two years, the Supreme Court of Florida has had the oppor-
tunity to discuss how this test should be applied to a number of appealed
homicide cases. In Morrison v. State," the court found that the nature of the
stab wounds, and the fact that the victim could have identified the victim,
were circumstances that supported the finding of premeditation.12
In Evans v. State,'3 the court was able to point to a number of pieces of
evidence that indicated that the defendant had considered killing the victim
before the fatal act. 14 The defendant had told a number of witnesses that he
was going to "'take care of his brother's work' for him" and specifically told
his prison-mate, before he was released from prison, that he was going to kill
his brother's girlfriend, whom he believed was unfaithful to his brother. 15 In
addition, there was evidence on the evening of the shooting that he was look-
ing for the victim.'
6
Similarly, the court found sufficient evidence of premeditation in Floyd
v. State.' 7 The evidence in this case included "selection and transportation of
a gun to the victim's home," remaining in the victim's home for a significant
period of time before shooting her, chasing the victim, and stating one day
prior to the killing that he was going to "kill his wife or someone she loved"
(the victim was the defendant's mother in law).'
8
In Conde v. State,'9 the court considered that the defendant had spent
considerable time with the victim before attacking her, the victim had strug-
gled during the attack, "it takes approximately three minutes to strangle
someone to death," and that the defendant had murdered five other victims in
9. Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 406 (Fla. 2000) (quoting DeAngelo v. State, 616
So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1993)).
10. Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 289 (Fla. 1990).
11. 818 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2002).
12. Id. at 453.
13. 838 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2002).
14. Id. at 1095.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2002).
18. Id. at 397.
19. 860 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2003).
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similar fashion.20 Taken together, the court found that these circumstances
constituted more than sufficient evidence of premeditation. El Similarly, in
Johnston v. State,22 the court found that evidence of manual strangulation
and defensive bruising on the victim-showing that she had struggled with
her assailant-were sufficient to support a finding of premeditation.23
It surely appears that the supreme court was correct in holding that these
defendants had formed a conscious purpose to kill more than a moment be-
fore the fatal act. It is hard to argue that these particular defendants did not
understand the nature of their acts or the probable results. This seems par-
ticularly easy in the strangulation cases where it takes more than a moment to
strangle someone and in these cases, the defendants overcome the struggling
defensive actions of the victims.2 4 In none of these cases did the court push
the limits of the brevity of time that even its definition of premeditation
could arguably permit, and some formulations of which by some courts have
come under criticism by commentators.25
III. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has also taken a look
at what the knowledge element in the statute outlawing the possession of
controlled substances requires. In Scott v. State,E6 the defendant was charged
with the possession of contraband in a correctional facility.2 7 At the conclu-
sion of the trial, defense counsel requested a jury instruction, pursuant to the
court's prior opinion in Chicone v. State,28 that the element of knowledge
requires that the defendant have "knowledge of the illicit nature of the sub-
stance possessed., 29 The court reiterated that mere knowledge of possession
20. Id. at 943.
21. Id.
22. 863 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2003).
23. Id. at 285.
24. See Johnson v. State, 863 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2003); Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla.
2002).
25. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, § 13.7(a) (Thompson
West 2003) (criticizing statements that premeditation "require[s] only a brief moment of
thought" or a "matter of seconds."); see also DRESSLER, supra note 5 at §31.04[C][3] (criticiz-
ing formulations that premeditation can be satisfied by "[a]ny interval of time between the
forming of the intent to kill and the execution of that intent, which is of sufficient duration for
the accused to be fully conscious of what he intended" or that "no time is too short for a
wicked man to frame in his mind the scheme of murder.").
26. 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002).
27. Id. at 168.
28. 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996).
29. Scott, 808 So. 2d at 168.
[Vol. 29: 1: 1
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of the substance was not sufficient; the defendant must also know the nature
of the substance. 30 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the lack
of knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance is an affirmative defense. 3'
The court explained how this case impacted its earlier opinion in State v.
Medlin,32 which seemed to be creating some confusion in the district courts
of appeal.33 In the Medlin case, the court had held that the possession of a
controlled substance raises a rebuttable presumption that the possessor is
aware of the nature of the drug possessed.34 The court noted that the Medlin
presumption applied in cases where the defendant had actual possession of
the contraband, and even then, only after the element of the illicit nature of
the drug was first explained to the jury. In the Scott case, the drugs were
found in the defendant's locker.36 Justice Wells argued in dissent that the
element was to be determined by the legislature, and that lack of knowledge
should be an affirmative defense.37
In a subsequent case, McMillon v. State,38 the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled that it was reversible error to deny a Chicone instruction in a case of
actual possession, but that the state was also entitled to a Medlin instruction
in such a case. 39 Similarly, the court in Washington v. State40 held that the
failure to provide the Chicone instruction in a case in which the defendant
sold a bag of cannabis was reversible error.4 1 In yet another case, William-
son v. State,42 the defendant was charged with illegal possession of codeine,4 3
30. Scott, 808 So. 2d at 169 (citing Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 744 (Fla. 1996)).
31. Id.
32. 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973).
33. Id. at 395.
34. Id at 397.
35. Scott, 808 So. 2d at 171.
36. Id. at 172.
37. Id. at 173.
38. 813 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2002).
39. Id. at 58. The erroneous jury instruction used by the trial court was the standard jury
instruction for possession cases. Id. The supreme court held this instruction inadequate be-
cause it did not "indicate that the State must prove the defendant had knowledge of the illicit
nature of the substance he possessed... [f]ailure to so instruct diminishes the State's respon-
sibility to prove each element of its case." Id.
40. 813 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2002).
41. Id. at 60.
42. 813 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 2002).
43. See id. at 62. Williamson was charged with violating section 893.13(6)(a) of the
Florida Statutes, which provides that:
It is unlawful for any person to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled sub-
stance unless such controlled substance was lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant
to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his or her profes-
sional practice or to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance except as
otherwise authorized by this chapter.
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and the court attempted to further explain the interrelationship of the two
instructions." In Williamson, the defendant was charged with stealing pills
marked "Tylenol," below which the word "codeine" was written; however,
the word was written in such fine print that it could not be read without the
aid of a microscope.45 In reversing the conviction for error because the trial
court had refused to give the Chicone instruction, the court again noted that
the Medlin presumption was applicable to cases in which the defendant had
actual possession or exclusive constructive possession, but that the presump-
tion might not be sufficient when there is other evidence which tends to ne-
gate it.46 Certainly, the Chicone and Medlin decisions have led to confusion
about the interrelationship of the opinions and the instructions to be given in
possession cases.47 The court's attempt to provide an explanation should be
helpful to Florida trials and lower appellate courts in the future.
IV. BURGLARY
The Supreme Court of Florida continued to address the application of
the burglary statute in relationship to its prior holdings in the case previously
discussed in Section II, Floyd v. State. In the most recent summary of Flor-
ida criminal law in this Law Review,48 the author discussed the disagreement
between the Supreme Court of Florida, as per its opinion in Delgado v.
State,49 and the Florida Legislature over the proper interpretation concerning
the "remaining in" portion of the state's burglary statute,"0 as well as, the
legislature's subsequent attempt to overturn the court's interpretation of that
51provision. In Floyd, the contested jury instruction did not include a finding
that the defendant remained in the victim's home surreptitiously; therefore,
the court reversed the armed burglary conviction, and was thus required to
reverse the felony murder conviction as well, because the burglary was the
Id. at 64.
44. See id. at 64-5.
45. Id. at 63.
46. Id. at 64.
47. See Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996); see State v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394
(Fla. 1973).
48. Adams, supra note 2, at 4-7.
49. 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000).
50. Adams, supra note 2, at 4-7.
51. See Adams, supra note 2, at 4-7. The relevant part of the statute, prior to amendment
by the legislature, stated that burglary included "remaining in a structure or a conveyance with
the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public
or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1989).
The Delgado case held that the defendant was only guilty of burglary if his remaining in the
structure or conveyance was done surreptitiously. Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 237.
[Vol. 29: 1:1
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predicate felony for the felony murder conviction. 2 Despite the fact that the
legislature indicated its desire to nullify the holding in Delgado, the court
noted that the amendment to the Act was made to operate retroactively to
February 1, 2000, and the killing in this case occurred prior to that date.53
The majority's holding in Floyd drew a dissent from Justice Wells, who ar-
gued that the legislature's intent in amending the burglary statute was to
completely nullify the holding in Delgado, which it believed improperly in-
terpreted the burglary statute.54
The court also attempted to clarify its Delgado decision in the Morrison
case discussed in Section II of this article.55 It noted that the victim's failure
to lock the door after telling the defendant that he could not come into the
apartment, and then closing the door, negated the defendant's argument that
his entry had been consensual; therefore, his case was similar to Delgado
where the victim had originally consented to the entry, but then withdrew
it.56 This rejection seems to be a reasonable construction of its earlier deci-
sion and the burglary statute.57
In State v. Byars,58 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the scope of
the "open to the public" provision of the burglary statute. 59 The accused in
Byars entered his wife's place of employment, a consignment store, despite a
domestic violence injunction prohibiting his presence there, and killed his
wife.60 The court found that the statute's reference to the public nature of the
premises was to be interpreted to refer to the general nature of the premises,
not the personal characteristics of the individual charged with the crime. 61 It
thus held that the injunction was irrelevant to the consideration of whether
the premises were open to the public. 62 The majority rejected contrary deci-
sions from other states and an argument of a contrary construction of the
Florida trespass statute because of differences in statutory language.63 The
52. Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383, 402 (2003).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 411. (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2002).
56. Id. at 454.
57. Id.
58. 823 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2002).
59. Section 810.02 of the Florida Statutes, says in part: "Burglary means entering or
remaining in a dwelling, structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense
therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or
invited to enter or remain." FLA. STAT. § 810.02 (2003).
60. Byars, 823 So. 2d at 740.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 743.
63. Id. at 743-45.
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statutory construction given to the statute by the court seems to be the most
reasonable one.64
V. OTHER CRIMES
The Supreme Court of Florida also dealt with a number of other sub-
stantive criminal issues during the past two years. In Wright v. State,65
"Wright was the driver of a vehicle from which [his] two cohorts wearing
masks emerged and robbed another driver., 66 Wright, who was not wearing
a mask, had his crime reclassified to the next higher degree under the Florida
statute increasing the severity of the category of crimes committed while the
offender was wearing one. 67 The majority properly held that the statute re-
quires that the defendant personally wear a hood, mask, or similar device, in
order to have his crime enhanced.68 Chief Justice Wells 69 dissented, arguing
that the legislature intended that an accomplice could be vicariously liable by
making this act a separate substantive crime, as opposed to merely a sentence
enhancer.
70
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the constitutionality of a
driver's license statute in Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor
Vehicles v. Critchfield.7 1 In Critchfield, the defendant had his license perma-
nently revoked in 1987 after his fourth DUI conviction. 72 At the time of his
sentencing, he was told that he would be eligible for a hardship license after
five years.73 However, when he applied in 1999, he was informed that he
64. Id.
65. 810 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2002).
66. Id. at 874.
67. See FLA. STAT. § 775.0845 (2003). Section 775.0845 of the Florida Statutes pro-
vides:
The felony or misdemeanor degree of any criminal offense, other than a violation of... [sec-
tions] 876.12-87.15, shall be reclassified to the next higher degree as provided in this section
if, while committing the offense, the offender was wearing a hood, mask, or other device that
concealed his or her identity.
Id.
68. Wright, 810 So. 2d at 874.
69. Formerly referred to as Justice Wells. Rule 2.030(2)(a) of the Florida Rules of Judi-
cial Administration provides that "[t]he chief justice shall be chosen by a majority vote of the
justices for a term commencing on July 1 of even-numbered years. If a vacancy occurs, a
successor shall be chosen promptly to serve the balance of the unexpired term." FLA. R. JUD.
ADMIN. 2.030 (2)(a).
70. Wright, 810 So. 2d at 876.
71. 842 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2003).
72. Id at 783.
73. Id at 784-85.
[Vol. 29: 1:1
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was no longer eligible because of a change in the law.74 The court found that
the amendment violated Florida's state constitutional requirement that each
statute contain but one subject v5  The amendments to the driver's license
statute also contained an amendment to the bad check statute, which involves
the assignment of a bad check debt to a private debt collector.7 6 The court
correctly considered this provision to be unrelated to the provisions regulat-
ing criminal penalties related to driver's licenses.7 7 Justice Cantero argued
that the provision should be upheld because one of the amendments in the
Act also provided for suspension of drivers' licenses for those passing worth-
less checks.7 8 The dissent also argued that doubts about whether the single
subject requirement was violated should be resolved in favor of upholding a
statute.79 Although it is true that the section on driver's license revocation
for passing bad checks was related to the other provisions relating to driver's
licenses, this arguably should not save this provision whose relationship to
most of the amendment was unrelated. 80 The need to prevent "logrolling" is
of sufficient importance to require the legislature to separate out unrelated
provisions when it proposes legislation into separate bills.81
In a separate case, the court considered a concept that has perplexed
courts, scholars, and law students throughout the ages.82  In Reynolds v.
State, the question was whether a crime is one that requires a general or a
specific intent by the defendant. 83 In this case, Ronald Reynolds was con-
victed of felony animal cruelty,84 which he argued required a specific intent
or, in the alternative, was unconstitutional if it did not so require.8 5 The issue
74. Id.
75. Id. at 784-85. Article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution provides, in pertinent
part: "[e]very law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and
the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title .... " FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
76. Critchfield, 842 So. 2d at 785.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 788.
79. Id. at 786.
80. Id.
81. Critchfield, 842 So. 2d at 785 (citing Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.
1991)).
82. Reynolds v. State, 842 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2002).
83. Id.
84. See FLA. STAT. § 828.12 (2) (2003). Section 828.12(2) of the Florida Statutes, pro-
vides:
A person who intentionally commits an act to any animal which results in the cruel death, or
excessive or repeated infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering, or causes the same to be
done, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or by a fine
of not more than $10,000 or both.
Id.
85. Reynolds, 842 So. 2d at 47.
9
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of what elements follow and modify the word "intentionally" is one that
comes up with some frequency in cases involving statutory construction. 6
In this case, the issue was whether it applied only to the commission of the
act itself or to the result of a cruel death or the infliction of unnecessary pain
or suffering. 87 The court distinguished the language in this statute from one
where the adjective at issue was followed immediately by a list of nouns.88 It
also distinguished it from another animal cruelty statutory section that more
clearly indicated that the mens rea element modified the result element in
that provision.8 9 The court also rejected the constitutional argument of the
defendant that his due process rights were violated because it found that the
statute did expressly have an intent requirement.90 Although the statute is
not a model of clarity in indicating the scope of the intent requirement, the
court seems to have applied the best interpretation in this case, particularly
when compared with the other animal cruelty statutory section noted. 91
The court considered the sufficiency of the evidence produced in a bur-
glary case in D.S.S. v. State.92 This case involved four juveniles who broke
into Plant City High School, where they committed acts of vandalism and
stole a number of items.93 They were charged with burglary, criminal mis-
chief, petit theft, and resisting an officer without violence.94 D.S.S. argued
that the state failed to prove its prima facie case by failing to show that the
Hillsborough County School Board owned the building into which the de-
fendants had illegally entered.95 Although the court held that ownership of
the building or structure is a material element of burglary, it also held that the
ownership element is not the same as would be required in property law.96
Rather, it argued that the "ownership" interest was possessory in nature; thus,
protecting "'any possession which is rightful as against the burglar and is
satisfied by proof of special or temporary ownership, possession, or con-
trol.' 97 The court upheld the verdict, despite a failure by the state to provide
86. Id. at 49.
87. Id. at 48.
88. Id. (distinguishing State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001)).
89. Id. at 49 (comparing section 828.12(2) that provides: "A person who tortures any
animal with intent to inflict intense pain, serious physical injury, or death upon the animal is
guilty of a felony of the third degree ... .
90. Reynolds, 842 So. 2d at 51.
91. Id.
92. 850 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2003).
93. Id. at 460.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 460-61.
96. Id. at 461.
97. D.S.S., 850 So. 2d at 461 (quoting In re ME., 370 So. 2d 795, 797 (Fla. 1979)).
[Vol. 29: 1 :1
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direct evidence of ownership of the building, by noting that there was con-
siderable circumstantial evidence of possession of the school building, in-
cluding references to the high school by various witnesses.98 Although it
appears that the court properly upheld the verdict, it serves as a warning to
attorneys to be careful about neglecting to provide evidence on a material
element, even if the material element seems to be undisputed.
Another situation involving alleged sloppiness in producing evidence
arose in the case of Glover v. State.99 In this case, Bruce Glover was charged
with capital sexual battery under section 794.011 (2)(a) of the Florida Stat-
utes.'00 Glover argued on appeal that the instructions given to the jury were
defective because the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury that the
age of the defendant was a material element of the case.' 0' The Supreme
Court of Florida resolved a conflict amongst the district courts by holding
that the age of the defendant is a material element.10 2 However, it upheld
Glover's conviction by holding that the proof of his age was not disputed
where the thirty-seven year old defendant sat in the courtroom and the book-
ing admission that he was born in 1964 was admitted into evidence and not
disputed. 1
03
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the application of the term
"carried" in Florida's robbery statute, 1°4 in State v. Burris.' 0 5 The case in-
volved Daniel Burris, who reached out the window of his pickup truck and
grabbed the victim's purse while he was driving past her, knocking her off
her feet and dragging her along the pavement. 10 6 The relevant statute in this
case enhanced the charge from a second-degree to a first-degree felony, be-
cause the accused carried a deadly weapon while committing the robbery.
10 7
The court rejected an opinion by the First District Court of Appeal that inter-
preted "carried" to be synonymous with "possessed."'' 0 8 The Supreme Court
of Florida applied the commonly ascribed definition to "carry" in this statute,
98. Id. at 462.
99. 863 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2003).
100. Id. at 237.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 238.
103. Id. at 237.
104. See FLA. STAT. § 812.13 (2003). Section 812.13 of the Florida Statutes provides:
"(1) 'Robbery' means the taking of money or other property... from the person or custody of
another... (2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or
other deadly weapon .. " § 812.13.
105. 875 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2004).
106. Id. at 409.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 410 (citing Jackson v. State, 662 So. 2d 1369, 1371-72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995)).
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looking to dictionary definitions to buttress its common sense interpretation
that carrying generally means holding, supporting, or bearing.'19 As the
court noted, automobiles generally carry people as opposed to people carry-
ing automobiles.110 It also looked to the legislature's intent in using this
term, which it perceived to be to deter robbers from bringing portable in-
struments to a robbery for the purpose of inflicting harm.1I' Furthermore,
although it noted that automobiles have been deemed deadly weapons in
other criminal statutes, it would require an improperly broad inference in this
provision, in violation of the court's duty to resolve ambiguous provisions in
favor of the defendant under the statutory rules of lenity. 11
2
The State v. Castillo13 case involved a police officer accused of seeking
or accepting unauthorized benefits in return for nonperformance of his offi-
cial duty under section 838.016(1) of the Florida Statutes. 14 In this case, the
officer stopped a motorist for speeding and driving while intoxicated." 5
According to the victim, the officer asked her to follow him in her car to a
deserted warehouse area, where he proceeded to engage in vaginal inter-
course with her." 6 The Third District Court of Appeal had reversed the con-
viction because there was no evidence of a specific agreement stated by the
parties that arrest would not occur if the victim had sex with him.'
As noted by the court, the statute is silent on the type of proof required
to show that the statute had been violated." l8 However, it reasonably held
that an express agreement should not be required lest defendants evade con-
viction by avoiding the making of explicit promises." 9 It went further by
rejecting the argument that even an implicit agreement was required since the
statute also criminalized the solicitation of a benefit. 120 It thus held that cor-
rupt intent was sufficient to support a conviction. 21 The latter statement is
probably an overstatement of the court's true intentions because even a so-
licitation involves more than mere intent, and to permit conviction on intent
alone would violate one of the basic tenets of criminal law in that crimes
109. Id. at412.
110. Burris, 875 So. 2d at 412.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 415 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) 2003)).
113. 877 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2004).
114. Id. at 691.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 692.
118. Castillo, 877 So. 2d at 693.
119. Id. (citing State v. Gerren, 604 So. 2d 515, 520 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
120. Id. at 694.
121. Id. at 695.
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must have at least some type of actus reus requirement. 22 Nonetheless, it
does seem an appropriate interpretation to hold that the statute does not re-
quire an agreement.123 The court found that the circumstantial evidence in




As can be seen by this review, the Supreme Court of Florida has not is-
sued any opinions in the past two years that seem to radically alter settled
criminal law principles in this jurisdiction. The battle over the proper inter-
pretation of Florida's burglary statute continued during the past two years
and is reflective of an ongoing debate with the state legislature over the dif-
ference between interpretation of the law and creating law. In most of the
substantive criminal areas addressed by the supreme court, Florida's criminal
law, and its interpretation by its highest court seems to be in line with the
approach taken by most American jurisdictions at this point in time.
122. Id.
123. Castillo, 877 So. 2d at 695.
124. Id. at 696.
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